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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
MUL TIPLE USE FISHERIES 
Keith R. Criddle 
ABSTRACT 
Arguments in favor of adopting rights-based management strategies have been developed 
primarily in the context of commercial fisheries and have focused on increasing the profitability of 
catcher vessel operations and reducing the incentive to deplete fish stocks. Relatively little attention has 
been given to the effects that alternative management regimes could have on the profitability of 
processing and support service businesses, consumer surplus, or to the interface between commercial 
fishing, sport fishing, and other use and nonuse demands for fishery resources. Although there is often 
congruence among users with respect to stock management and rule enforcement objectives, other 
objectives are mutually incompatible. This paper begins with a simple conceptual analysis of the effects 
of alternative regimes for management of a charter-based recreational fishery on the magnitude of net 
benefits in the sport fishery and in an associated commercial fishery. A theoretical framework for 
identifying the optimal commercial-sport allocation and the optimal sustainable yield is developed in the 
subsequent section. The final section reports the results of an empirically based comparative static 
simulation of commercial and charter-based sport fishing for halibut off Alaska. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
MUL TIPLE USE FISHERIES 
The collapse of fished stocks and the depressed economic condition of commercial 
fisheries have been attributed to an incongruence between individually rational decisions and 
globally optimal outcomes, an incongruence that arises from the perverse institutional structures 
that govern access to and ownership of fishery resources. Traditional approaches to fisheries 
management have been predicated on regulatory structures that attempt to control the 
opportunity to catch too many fish; these approaches have been expensive and have failed to 
protect fish stocks or to improve the economic performance of fisheries. In contrast, rights-based 
approaches to fisheries management are based on the observation that rational self-interest can 
promote socially optimal outcomes when the bundle of entitlements and obligations pertaining to 
ownership are clearly defined and comprehensive and when all interested parties are eligible to 
negotiate mutually agreeable transactions. Consequently, rights-based approaches focus on the 
design of institutional structures that define property rights in fish or fishing areas. Theoretical 
and empirical analyses have demonstrated that sole ownership (e.g. Gordon 1953, 1954; Scott 
1955), individual quotas (e.g. Moloney and Pearse 1979; Pearse 1980; Morey 1980; Wilen 1985; 
Scott 1988; Johnson and Libecap 1982; Keen 1983; Gauvin et al. 1994; Casey et al. 1995; Wang 
1995; NRC 1999), territorial use rights (e.g., Agnello and Donnelley 1975; Christy 1982; Berkes 
1986; Acheson 1988; Ruddle 1989; Seijo 1993; McCay 1998; Criddle et al. 2001), corporate 
fishing or fishing cooperatives (Townsend 1995; 1997; Larkin and Sylvia 1999; Criddle and 
Macinko 2000; Felthoven 2001; Matulich, Sever, and Inaba 2001 ), and common property 
management regimes (e.g., Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; Stevenson 1991; Ostrom et al. 1994; 
McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; and Bromley 1992) can promote biologically 
sustainable and economically profitable fisheries . 
Nevertheless, implementation of rights-based solutions has met with resistance, due in 
part to concern about the mechanisms used to initially allocate ownership, concern about impacts 
on entities that are excluded from holding comprehensive or partitioned property rights, and 
concern about the compatibility of private property rights with the Public Trust character of 
fishery resources. In the US, the initial allocation problem arises from provisions in the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) that have been interpreted as a prohibition against 
market-based initial allocations. Because initial allocations have been based on political-
procedural rules related to past participation, the rule setting process has engendered 
economically wasteful rent-seeking activities and induced speculative entry that has increased 
the number of participants and level of fishing effort in periods immediately preceding program 
implementation (Stollery 1986, Anderson and Hill 1990). The same political processes have 
resulted in restrictions on who is eligible to own fishing rights. Those who are excluded from the 
initial allocation or prohibited from subsequent acquisition of fishing rights argue that they have 
been deprived of their presumptive entitlement and that total net benefits have been reduced by 
their exclusion (see e.g., NRC 1999; Matulich et al. 1999; Matulich and Sever 1999). In addition, 
the Public Trust character of fishery resources limits the conditions under which exclusive use 
rights can be conveyed to individuals (McCay 1998; Macinko 1993). 
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Recommendations favoring adoption of rights-based management strategies have been 
developed primarily in the context of commercial fisheries and have focused on increasing the 
profitability of catcher vessel operations and reducing the incentive to deplete fish stocks. 
Relatively little attention has been given to the effects that alternative management regimes 
could have on the profitability of processing and support service businesses, consumer surplus, 
or to the interface between commercial fishing, sport fishing, and other use and nonuse demands 
for fishery resources. Insouciance about consumer surplus can be attributed to the implicit 
assumption that the demand for any particular fish stock is perfectly elastic, an assumption that is 
not supported in empirical analyses. It is similarly unreasonable to focus exclusively on the 
commercial fishery in as much as most fish stocks support a variety of commercial, sport, and 
other use and nonuse services, the provision of which may be subject to different management 
regimes, and the benefits of which accrue to different beneficiaries. Although there is often 
congruence among users with respect to stock management and rule enforcement objectives 
(Merritt and Criddle 1993), other objectives are mutually exclusive or are mutually unreachable, 
especially when the stock is stochastic or when there are lags in the feedback between 
information generating processes and the implementation of controls (Criddle and Streletski 
2000). An example of the interface between commercial and sport fisheries will be explored in 
the following sections. The first section provides a simple conceptual analysis of the effects of 
alternative regimes for management of a charter-based recreational fisheryl on the magnitude of 
net benefits in the sport fishery and in an associated commercial fishery. The subsequent section 
develops a theoretical framework for identifying the optimal commercial-sport allocation and the 
optimal sustainable yield. The final section reports the results of an empirically based 
comparative static simulation of commercial and charter-based sport fishing for halibut off 
Alaska. 
1. A Conceptual Analysis of the Interface Between Commercial and Sport Fisheries 
This section examines the economic consequences of four alternative management 
regimes for commercial and charter-based sport fisheries. It will be assumed that the target 
species is not caught in any other fishery (e.g. subsistence, self-guided sportfishing, bycatch)2, 
that nonuse values are inconsequential, that trophic interactions with other species are 
insignificant, and that the fishery is governed by a management entity that establishes and 
enforces a binding overall cap on the sum of commercial and sport catches. It will also be 
assumed that landed catches in the sport fishery are a constant multiple of the number of 
sportfishing trips taken and that the nonpecuniary attributes of sportfishing trips are immutable. 
That is, charter service providers are assumed to compete through price alone; trip length and 
amenities are assumed to be identical across charter services. 
1.1 Regulated Open Access Commercial Fishing and Open Access Sport Fishing 
The archetypal form of interaction between commercial and sport fisheries involves a 
commercial fishery subject to an overall catch quota but without efficacious constraints on 
fishing capacity and a sport fishery that lacks binding constraints on catch and fishing capacity. 
While the economic consequences of regulated open access management of the commercial 
fishery are explored in for example, Romans and Wilen (1997) and Wilen and Romans (1998), 
the interaction with a sport fishery has not been examined. It will be assumed that anticipated 
increases in the demand for sportfishing trips will invariably be accommodated through 
reductions in the overall commercial quota. Because the number of charter operators is large and 
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barriers to entry are relatively small, charter operators will be assumed to behave as perfect 
competitors. Thus the market supply of sportfishing trips (the sum of n homogeneous individual 
firm supply functions) is perfectly elastic and individual firms face a perfectly elastic demand for 
their services. The short- and long-run consequences of an increase in the demand for 
sportfishing trips can be represented by: 
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Figure 1. Short- and long-run net economic benefits in an open-access sport fishery in response 
to an increased demand for sportfishing trips. 
An increase in the demand for sportfishing trips from Dl to D2 leads to an increase in 
angler surplus from the area represented by bed to the areas represented by efd* in the short-run 
and eb * d* in the long run, where charter capacity is fixed in the short-run and unconstrained in 
the long run. Charter capacity expansion is induced by an ephemeral increase in charter operator 
surplus represented by beef. The price of sportfishing trips rises from e to e in the short-run, 
but returns to c in the long run as charter service providers compete for clients. Thus the 
ultimate consequences of the expanded demand for sportfishing are an increase in the number of 
sportfishing trips taken, an increase in angler surplus, and an increase in charter capacity. 
Although sportfishing trip prices and charter operator profits increase in the short-run, they 
return to ex -ante levels in the long run. 
Because the commercial fishery is constrained by an overall quota but the number of 
participants is unregulated, the ownership-by-capture rule leads to the adoption of cost-
increasing technologies so that in equilibrium, the marginal harvester earns a normal return. The 
short- and long-run consequences of increased demand for sportfishing trips on profitability and 
post-harvest surplus in a regulated open-access commercial fishery can be represented by: 
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Figure 2. Short- and long-run changes in net economic benefits in a quota constrained open-
access commercial fishery in response to an increased demand for sportfishing trips. 
4 
In this example, increased demand for sportfishing trips is accommodated by a reduction of 
the overall commercial quota from Ql to Q2 . Before the overall quota is reduced, exvessel price 
is d , fleet-wide producer surplus is ade and post-harvest surplus is deh. The immediate 
consequences of the quota reduction are an increase in the exvessel price to f and a reduction in 
post-harvest surplus to fgh. The short-run change in exvessel net revenue to abfg could entail an 
increase or a decrease depending on the elasticities of demand and supply. In either case, the 
quota reduction and concomitant price increase results in above normal profits represented by 
bcfg . The presence of above normal profits attracts increased effort (additional boats or an 
intensified race for catch among existing boats) that leads to upward shifts of the supply function 
from S 1 to S 2 until the marginal harvester earns no more than a normal return. The race for 
catch dissipates a portion of the exvessel net revenues (aa * bg ), leading to a long-run decline 
from ade to a * fg . Thus in the long-run, accommodation of increased sportfishing demand 
increases exvessel price, reduces exvessel net revenues, and reduces post-harvest surplus, 
irrespective of the elasticity of supply or demand. 
1.2 IFQ-Based Commercial Fishing and Open Access Sport Fishing 
Economists have long argued that a well-designed IFQ program can increase the profitability 
of commercial fishing and possibly reduce the incentive to over harvest fish stocks. However, 
little attention has been given to the interface between an IFQ managed commercial fishery and 
other fisheries that exploit the same stock. In this and subsequent examples, it will be assumed 
that the commercial fishery is subject to an IFQ regime wherein individual harvesters hold 
exclusive rights to harvest of a percentage of an overall quota set by the management authority. 
It is assumed that the sport fishery lacks meaningful constraints on catch and fishing capacity 
and that the management authority will invariably accommodate anticipated increases in the 
demand for sportfishing trips through reductions in the overall commercial quota that lead to 
proportionate reductions in the annual realization of the IFQs. Because assumptions about the 
sport fishery are unchanged from the previous example, the short- and long-run effects on the 
sport fishery of an increase in the demand for sportfishing trips are also unchanged. However, 
because the commercial fishery is IFQ-based, the effects on the commercial fishery are markedly 
different from those in the previous example. The following pair of graphs represents these 
short- and long-run consequences: 
Short-run Long-run 
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Figure 3. Short- and long-run changes in net economic benefits in an IFQ-based commercial 
fishery in response to an increased demand for sportfishing trips. 
Before the quota reduction, the exvessel price is d , exvessel net revenue is abde, and 
post harvest surplus is def . The exvessel net revenue includes a single-period quota share value 
of bcde. Immediately following the commercial quota reduction (from Ql to Q2) required to 
accommodate the increased demand for sportfishing trips, exvessel price rises to d* , post-
harvest surplus declines to d* e * f , and exvessel net revenue changes to ab * d* e * . Although the 
change in exvessel net revenue could be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the 
commercial quota and the elasticity of exvessel demand, the total net benefits of commercial 
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fishing are unambiguously reduced because ab * e * f is strictly less than abef. In contrast with 
the previous example, there is no difference between the long-run and short-run consequences of 
an increase in the demand for sport fishing trips. Moreover, the long-run reduction in commercial 
fishing net benefits is smaller under IFQ management than it is under regulated open access 
(Figure 2). That is, IFQ-based management helps the commercial fishery mitigate the adverse 
impacts of increased allocations to the sport fishery. 
1.3 IFQ-Based Commercial Fishing and Regulated Open Access Sport Fishing 
In the first two examples, it was assumed that the management authority is incapable of 
or unwilling to control the total magnitude of sportfishing catches. However, in fact, 
management agencies employ a variety of gear restrictions, bag, possession, and retention limits, 
size restriction, and seasonal and diurnal closures that influence the magnitude of sportfishing 
catches. In this example, it will be assumed that some combination of these instruments can be 
used to limit total sportfishing catches. In the previous examples, increased demand for 
sportfishing trips induced an expansion of charter capacity such that current and new operators 
adopted profit-maximizing combinations of inputs and services. However, because the charter 
service providers were assumed to be homogenous and to operate in a perfectly competitive 
market, they earned normal profits in the long run. In a quota constrained sport fishery, charter 
service providers compete to provide a limited number of trips (recollect that landed catches 
were assumed to be a constant multiple of the number of sportfishing trips taken). Competition 
for clients creates a pressure to increase the "quality" of services offered (at a given price) or to 
reduce the price per trip (of a given quality). These effects can be represented graphically: 
Short-run Long-run 
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Figure 4. Short- and long-run changes in net economic benefits in a quota constrained 
charter-based sport fishery in response to an increased demand for sportfishing trips. 
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If the charter fleet is comprised of small homogeneous operators, in the short run, an 
increase in the demand for sportfishing trips results in an increase in trip prices from e to e * and 
creation of above-normal profits for charter operators (ab * ee * ). Despite the increase in trip 
prices, angler surplus is unaffected because b * c* d* is equal to bed. In the long run, the above 
normal profit induces competition among charter operators that leads to trip price decreases (to 
e ) and eventually transfers the value of the above normal profits from the charter operators to 
their clients. These results will hold even if the number of charter operators is capped, as long as 
there is latent capacity, because each charter-operator has an incentive to add services or lower 
prices to attract additional clients. Consequently, the long-run consequence of the expanded 
demand for sportfishing under a quota-constrained charter fishery is an increase in angler surplus 
and in social welfare as the number of charter operations does not increase to the point that 
congestion and localized depletion externalities serve to reduce the value of trip attributes to the 
charter customers. Although sportfishing trip prices and charter operator profits increase in the 
short run, they ultimately return to their ex -ante levels. Increases in the demand for charter trips 
do not affect the commercial fishery in this example because the charter fleet is quota 
constrained. 
1.4 IFQ-Based Commercial and Sport Fishing 
The preponderance of experience suggests that allocations between commercial, sport, 
and other use and nonuse activities are unlikely to be definitively settled by any single 
management decision. Instead, the allocation battle is reprised whenever a user group perceives 
that its negotiating position has improved. Ifby some fortuitous circumstance, the political 
processes arrive at an optimal allocation, the optimality will prove short-lived because it is 
conditional on constant exvessel price, factor costs, stock abundance, recreation trip costs, the 
opportunity cost of alternative recreational activities, angler success, etc. The conceptual appeal 
of an integrated sport-commercial IFQ management regime is that it would rely on voluntary 
market transactions to continuously adjust the allocation such that marginal net benefits are 
equated across uses and to ensure that quota share buyers compensate sellers for the private 
value of their IFQs. If the distribution of IFQ between the charter and commercial fisheries is 
initially in equilibrium, the short- and long-run consequences to the sport fishery of an increase 
in the demand for sportfishing trips can be represented by: 
Short-run Long-run 
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Figure 5. Short- and long-run changes in net economic benefits in an IFQ-based charter fishery 
in response to an increased demand for sportfishing trips. 
In the short run, an increase in the demand for charter trips from D 1 to D 2 leads to an 
increase in trip price from c to e and an increase of bcde in charter operator surplus. Angler 
surplus is unchanged in the short run because area deg is equal to area be! . In the long run, 
charter operators will purchase additional quota shares, increasing the quantity of trips supplied 
from Ql to Q2 . The purchase of additional IFQs leads to an increase in the average operating 
cost from c to e* . Recreational anglers are willing to pay e* for Q2 trips. Charter service 
providers will purchase the additional IFQs as long as area b * e * d* e * is at least as great as bede. 
If charter operators purchase additional IFQs, the angler surplus increases from deg to d* e * g * . 
Because the opportunity cost of holding the additional IFQs is b * e * d* e * , charter operators 
continue to earn normal profits in the long run. Thus the overall effect of an increase in the 
demand for charter-based sportfishing trips is an increase in angler net benefits and a 
conservation of normal profits for charter operators. 
There is no short-run effect on the commercial fishery, because the sport fishery is 
initially constrained by ex-ante IFQ holdings. In the long run, the charter service providers can 
purchase additional quota shares from the commercial fishery. The key difference between this 
example and the immediately preceding (Figure 4) is that, in the present example, the 
commercial fishery must agree to the transfer and will only do so if the marginal value of an 
additional unit of quota share is worth more to the charter service providers than it is to 
commercial harvesters. The results are represented graphically in the following pair of graphs: 
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Figure 6. Short- and long-run changes in net economic benefits in an IFQ-based commercial 
fishery in response to an increased demand for sportfishing trips. 
If the commercial fishery sells IFQs into the charter sector, the total commercial quota 
will decline from Ql to Q2 causing exvessel price to rise from d to d* and reducing post-
harvest surplus from del to d* e* I . If the market for IFQs was initially in equilibrium, the 
reduction of commercial quota will result in a decrease in exvessel net revenue. However for the 
transfer to be consummated, the charter operators would have had to pay enough to offset the 
present value of foregone future exvessel net revenues. 
Note however that because the charter operators and commercial harvesters do not 
benefit from angler surplus or post-harvest surplus, they will not consider the effect of quota 
transfers on the magnitude of those net benefits. Consequently, although an integrated sport-
commercial IFQ management regime will ensure efficiency from the perspective of commercial 
harvesters and charter operators, it is unlikely to ensure welfare maximization. 
2. A Theoretical Model of Optimal Sport-Commercial Allocations in the Halibut Fishery 
The overall management objective for an integrated commercial and sport fishery can be 
characterized as a constrained maximization of the net present benefits of commercial and sport 
fishing over time: 
T 
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Maximize NB = Lot I(NBe,t,NBs,t) (1) 
t=to 
subj ect to Xt = I ( Xt -/ , he ,t -1 , hs ,t -1 ), (2) 
where NBe,t and NBs,t are the net benefits of commercial and sport fishing, Xt is the biomass of 
the target species, he,t and hs,t are the commercial and sport fishing catches, and 0 is the 
discount factor. Expanding on a commercial sector model developed in Criddle (1994), a sport 
fishery model based on Herrmann et al. (200 1), and an approximate model of population 
dynamics introduced in Criddle and Havenner (1991), the net benefits of commercial and sport 
fishing, and the stock dynamics can be described by: 
NBc,t = TR - TC + CS = ahc,t - ~ bht,t - cahf,~ xf2 + bht,t = ahc,t + ~ bht ,t - cahf,~ xf2 (3) 
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NBs,t = ¢ In (hs,t + 1) (4) 
(2') 
where TR, TC, and CS are the total revenues, costs, and post-harvest surpluses associated with 
commercial harvests, and a, b, c, a, (31, (32, ¢, 10, 1 1, and ,2 are estimated parameters. 
Based on these relationships, and imposing sustainability on the stock dynamics constraint, the 
model can be rewritten: 
T 
Maximize NB = ~ 5t (ahe,t + h bh;,t - cahf,~xf2 + ¢ In (hs,t + 1) ) 
t=to 
subject to fzt = he,t + hs,t = (,1 -l)Xt + 12xf· 
The solution to this problem can be obtained from the solution to a related, but 
unconstrained problem: 
.. ~ t a e,t 12 e,t - ca e,tXt ( () 2 ) T [h + Ilbh2 h{3/ {32 ] MaXImIze L = D 5 + At he,t + hs,t - ,1 -1 Xt + 12 Xt 
t = to +¢ In ( hs,t + 1 ) 
(l ') 
(2') 
(5) 
The derivatives of this Lagrangian with respect to the control variables (he,t and hs,t) and 
Lagrange multipliers (At) provide a set of necessary conditions for an optimum: 3 
dL ( 2 . dA = he,t + hs,t - 11 -l)Xt + ,2Xt = 0 
t 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
The total net benefits of commercial and sport fishing are maximized when the marginal 
net benefits of commercial fishing are equated with the marginal net benefits of sportfishing. 
3. An Empirical Model of Optimal Sport-Commercial Allocations in the Halibut Fishery 
Allocation of catch among competing user-groups is a contentious and perennial issue; 
the oft-rancorous disputes can place paralyzing demands on management agency time. Under 
IFQs, voluntary market transactions replace the regulatory allocation process. While IFQs have 
been implemented in several commercial fisheries, IFQs have not yet been implemented in a US 
sport fishery. Issues related to the implementation ofIFQs in commercial fisheries and the 
magnitude and distribution of benefits among initial IFQ recipients, subsequent purchasers of 
IFQ, processors, consumers, and regional economies remain controversial (NRC, 1999). In 
addition to raising many of the same implementation and distribution issues associated with 
commercial fishery IFQ programs, sport fishing IFQs raise issues related to the Public Trust.4 
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The halibut fishery off Alaska is the only US fishery with an IFQ-based commercial 
sector and a large sportfishing component. 5 Moreover, both fisheries are economically 
significant to the Pacific Northwest region. Gross exvessel revenue from commercial sales of 
halibut was $135 million in 2000 (Hiatt et al. 2001). Herrmann et al. (2001) estimate that over 
$19 million in compensating variation was generated by halibut sportfishing trips in Lower and 
Central Cook Inlet during 1997. Halibut are managed under the Halibut Convention of 1923, a 
bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Canada. The treaty established the International 
Fisheries Commission (now the International Pacific Halibut Commission), a scientific body 
with responsibility for conducting stock assessments and recommending conservation measures 
for halibut in the Pacific Northwest, Gulf of Alaska, Aleutian Islands, and Eastern Bering Sea. In 
1976, the Commission's management authority was extended to the 200-mile fisheries 
conservation zones established pursuant to the US Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
(FCMA) and equivalent Canadian legislation. Canadian and US halibut fishers were excluded 
from each other's territorial and extended jurisdiction waters in 1978. Although the IPHC retains 
authority to establish area specific harvest limits, each nation is individually responsible for 
allocating catches within its national and extended jurisdiction waters such that the sum of 
commercial, sport, and other removals does not exceed the IPHC catch limits. 
Access to the commercial fishery was unrestricted prior to the passage of the FCMA. 
Immediately following implementation of the FCMA in 1976, the North Pacific Fisheries 
Management Council (Council) proposed a limited entry program. The proposal was shelved in 
late 1978 during negotiations over the US-Canada Halibut Convention. The Council next 
approved a I-year moratorium on entry for 1982, but because the action was conditional on 
passage of an amended North Pacific Halibut Act and because the amended Act was not passed 
until after the start of the 1982 fishing season, no action was taken. In early 1983, the Council 
approved a 3-year moratorium, however the NOAA administrator disapproved the action and 
suggested that the Council instead investigate a permanent limited entry system. The Council 
began consideration ofIFQs for the commercial fishery in 1988. The final rule creating halibut 
and sablefish IFQs was published in the Federal Register in 1993 and implemented in 1995 
(Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). 
The Council sets a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limit for the commercial fishery by 
subtracting a bycatch allowance and expected non-commercial (sport and subsistence) catches 
from the annual IPHC catch limit.6 Halibut bycatch mortality has been capped at about 18% of 
the IPHC catch limit in recent years. Subsistence and personal-use halibut catches are small (less 
than 0.2% of the IPHC catch limit). The share of halibut caught by sport fishers, particularly in 
the Central Gulf of Alaska Region (Area 3A: Prince William Sound, Resurrection Bay, Kodiak, 
Yakutat, Cook Inlet, and adjacent portions of the Gulf of Alaska), has increased from less than 
2% of total removals in the late 1970's to over 18% in the 1990's (IPHC 1999, Howe et al. 
1998). Even before implementation of IFQs, commercial fishers were concerned that unchecked 
expansion of the sport fishery would reduce commercial fishing opportunities, particularly in 
periods of declining halibut biomass. That concern increased substantially after IFQs were 
implemented. Not only do sportfishing catches reduce the quantity of fish available to individual 
commercial fishers in any given year and thus reduce commercial net revenues, expansion of 
sportfishing reduces the wealth of IFQ holders because the asset value of the IFQ is a function of 
the discounted stream of future profits and thus a function of current and expected future catches. 
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In response to the intensified allocation conflicts between commercial and sport interests, 
the Council approved establishment of a cap on charter-based sportfishing catches (NPFMC 
2000). The cap, called a guideline harvest level (GHL), was set equal to the 1995-1999 average 
charter-based sportfishing harvest with provisions for a reduction in the GHL if stock biomass 
declines. Under the GHL, subsistence harvests and harvests by sport fishers who do not hire 
guide/charter services will continue to be deducted from the commercial T AC. If approved by 
the Secretary of Commerce, the GHL will be implemented in 2002. The Council regards the 
GHL as a stopgap measure because it fails to directly limit expansion of the charter fleet and 
because there is little confidence that traditional sport fishery management measures can 
effectively constrain catch. Consequently, in April 2001, the Council approved a fishery 
management plan to establish an IFQ program for the charter sector (NPFMC 2001). If approved 
by the Secretary of Commerce, the charter IFQ program will replace the GHL in 2003. 
The following results are based on an empirically based deterministic discrete-time 
comparative static simulation-optimization of equations (1 ') and (2 ') derived in Criddle (2002). 
The results characterize the net economic benefits of the set of feasible sustainable commercial-
sport allocations of halibut in Alaska. Considered independently, the sustainable net benefits of 
commercial and sport fishing can be represented by: 
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Figure 7. Sustainable exvessel net revenue, post-harvest surpluses, commercial net benefits, and 
angler net benefits. 
Exvessel net revenues are maximized at a sustainable yield of 42 million lbs. and a 
corresponding biomass of 537 million lbs. The solution that maximizes the net benefits of 
commercial fishing is a sustainable yield of 54 million lbs at a biomass of 490 million lbs. The 
net benefit maximizing harvest level exceeds the level of harvests that maximizes exvessel net 
revenue because post-harvest surplus is strictly increasing in catch. That is, when benefits to the 
purchasers of halibut are treated on an equal footing with benefits to harvesters, the optimal 
harvest level differs from the level that would be optimal from the perspective of a sole-owner or 
a group of IFQ rights-holders who behave as though they were a sole-owner. 
In a purely recreational fishery, the model suggests that angler surplus is maximized 
under a maximum sustainable yield management strategy. However, because marginal utility is a 
declining function of sport catches, the incremental net benefits of catches greater than about 20 
million lbs. are quite small. 
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Independent optimization of commercial and sport fishing net benefits fails to provide a 
mechanism for partitioning the sustainable yield and fails to ensure welfare maximization 
because it does not equate the marginal net benefits of commercial and sport fishing. Following 
Criddle (2002), the feasible set of optimal sustainable commercial-sport allocations and net 
benefits can be represented by: 
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Figure 8. Optimal allocation of the sustainable yield and sustainable net benefits of halibut to 
sport commercial fisheries (Criddle 2002). 
Because the marginal net benefits of sport fishing exceed the marginal net benefits of 
commercial fishing at low sustainable yields, most of the sustainable yield is initially allocated to 
the sport fishery. 7 As the quantity of fish allocated to the sport fishery increases, the marginal net 
benefit of additional sport fish catches declines. At intermediate levels of biomass, the marginal 
net benefits of commercial fishing exceed the marginal net benefits of additional allocations to 
the sport fishery and it is optimal to allocate an increasingly large share of the sustainable yield 
to the commercial fishery. At very high biomass levels, the sustainable yield is small and it is 
again optimal to allocate most of the sustainable yield to the sport fishery. The overall optimal 
solution is to manage for a biomass of 444 million lbs and to allocate 71 % of the 63 million lbs 
sustainable yield to the commercial fishery, with the balance allocated to sportfishing. The 
overall optimal is solution provides $55.2 million in net revenue to commercial harvesters, $26.2 
million in post-harvest surplus to the purchasers of commercial catches, and $51.9 million in 
angler surplus. 
Because the social welfare maximizing solution is suboptimal with respect to the private 
net benefits that accrue to different stakeholders, the actual solution may closely reflect the 
preferences of the politically empowered. Table 1 reflects solutions that independently maximize 
exvessel net revenues, post-harvest surplus, the net benefits of commercial fishing, and angler 
surplus by allocating the entire sustainable yield to either the commercial or sport fishery. The 
maximum sustained yield and open access solutions are also represented. 
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Table I.-Characteristics of alternative management regimes independently optimized for 
commercial or sport fishing. 
Open Max(SY) Max(NRc) Max(CSc) Max(NBc) Max(NBs) 
Access 
Biomass (million lbs.) 444.5 326.1 536.5 326.1 490 326.1 
Commercial catch (million lbs.) 62.7 72.3 42.2 72.3 54.0 0 
Sport catch (million lbs.) 0 0 0 0 0 72.3 
Exvessel price ($) $1.12 $1.42 $2.21 $1.42 $1.90 
Commercial effort (million skates) 0.167 0.381 0.055 0.381 0.100 0 
Exvessel net revenue ($ million) 0 -$41.9 $72.0 -$41.9 $64.4 0 
Post-harvest surplus ($ million) $51.1 $67.8 $23.1 $67.8 $37.9 0 
Commercial net benefits ($ million) $51.1 $25.9 $95.1 $25.9 $102.2 0 
Angler surplus ($ million) 0 0 0 0 0 $75.7 
Total net benefits ($ million) $51.1 $25.9 $95.1 $25.9 $102 .2 $75.7 
The open access solution represents a fishery managed without consideration of benefits 
to commercial consumers or sport fishers and where the commercial fishers are unable to agree 
to behave like a sole owner. While the open access solution does not provide positive net 
revenue to commercial fishers or positive angler surplus to sport fishers, it provides substantial 
($51 million) net benefits to the purchasers of commercially harvested fish. Post-harvest surplus 
is reduced under management regimes that maximize exvessel net revenues (sole-owner or fully 
efficient IFQ) or maximize the net benefits of commercial fishing. This result provides an 
explanation for why processors often oppose the implementation of rights-based fishery 
management programs. In a purely commercial fishery, maximization of the sustained yield 
generates $68 million in post-harvest surplus and results in net operating losses of $42 million 
for commercial fishers. Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that commercial fishers would 
voluntarily harvest the MSY. Angler surplus is maximized when commercial fishing is 
disallowed and catches approximate MSY. A sole owner of an exclusively commercial fishery 
would choose to harvest a sustainable yield of 42 million lbs, earning $72 million in exvessel net 
revenues and coincidentally providing $23 million in post-harvest surplus. If fishery managers 
were interested in maximizing the total net benefits of commercial fishing, they would set the 
T AC equal to 54 million lbs and implement regulations to induce commercial harvesters to 
behave like a sole owner. In so doing, the commercial fishery would generate total net benefits of 
$102 million comprised of$64 million in exvessel net revenue for harvesters and $38 million in 
post-harvest surplus. 
The results reported Table 2 maximize net benefits to various stakeholders conditional on 
the optimal allocation of sustainable yields between the commercial and sport fisheries. 
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Table 2.-Characteristics of alternative management regimes jointly optimized for commercial 
and sport fishing. 
Max(SY) Max(NRc) Max(CSc) Max(NBc) Max(NBs) Max(NB) 
Biomass (million lbs.) 326.1 512.1 422.5 474.5 192.3 443.5 
Commercial catch (million lbs.) 37.1 37.4 45 .3 42.7 8.9 44.9 
Sport catch (million lbs.) 35.2 11.4 20.6 14.6 51.2 18.0 
Exvessel price ($) $2.34 $2.33 $2.12 $2.19 $3.07 $2.13 
Commercial effort (million skates) 0.136 0.066 0.117 0.089 0.048 0.107 
Exvessel net revenue ($ million) $34.9 $61.9 $51.7 $59.5 $9.2 $55.2 
Post-harvest surplus ($ million) $17.8 $18.1 $26.7 $23.6 $1.0 $26.2 
Commercial net benefits ($ million) $52.8 $80.0 $78.4 $83.1 $10.2 $81.4 
Angler surplus ($ million) $63.3 $44.3 $54.2 $48.5 $69.7 $51.9 
Total net benefits ($ million) $116.1 $124.3 $132.6 $131.6 $80.0 $133.3 
It is notable that the overall optimal solution suboptimal from the myopic perspective of 
commercial harvesters, the purchasers of commercial harvests, and recreational anglers. From 
the perspective of commercial fishers, the solutions that maximize exvessel net revenues, 
commercial net benefits, and even post-harvest surplus are all preferred to the solution that 
maximizes overall net benefits. Similarly, sport fishers prefer solutions that maximize angler 
surplus, maximize sustainable yields, or maximize post-harvest surplus. Another important result 
presented in Table 2 is that consideration of the joint benefits of commercial and sport fishing 
provides larger overall net benefits than are generated when the goal of fishery management is 
solely motivated by an interest in maximizing net benefits to commercial or sport fishers alone 
(Table 1). The results also emphasize the importance of considering post-harvest surplus. 
Because the solutions that maximize overall net benefits, maximize post-harvest surplus, 
or maximize the net benefits of commercial fishing produce similar levels of overall net benefits, 
there are multiple nearly equally efficient solutions with differing distributional consequences. 
Consequently, even if all of the stakeholders agree to abide by a solution that maximized net 
benefits across uses, they will probably contest specific allocation decisions if political-
regulatory processes are used to effect the allocation. 
Because changes in the demand or supply functions in the commercial fishery, changes in 
the willingness to payor cost of participating in the sport fishery, and changes in ocean 
productivity affect the optimal sustainable yield and the optimal allocation of the optimal 
sustainable yield, any initially optimal allocation will be suboptimal in subsequent periods. 
Consequently, to maximize net benefits, allocations need to be revised whenever the economic 
or biological conditions change. When allocations are determined in a political process, interest 
groups have an incentive to overstate the marginal value of additional shares. An integrated 
commercial-sport IFQ management regime shifts the allocation decision from the management 
arena into the market place. However, the mere act of adopting an integrated commercial-sport 
IFQ regime will not by itself ensure that overall net benefits are maximized unless the rights are 
defined in a way that causes the value of post-harvest and angler surplus to be expressed in the 
market price for quota shares. Indeed, failure to account for post-harvest surplus could be 
considered to be the basis for the opposition by processors to harvester-only IFQ programs 
(Matulich et al. 1999, Matulich and Sever 1999, NRC 1999). Similarly, to the extent that 
restrictions on ownership and transfer of IFQs exclude interested parties, efficiency is 
squandered and political opposition is fomented. The challenge then is to devise a rights-based 
regime that will encourage expression of the full suite of use and nonuse values. While it is 
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possible that elimination of ownership restrictions might be sufficient to eliminate the 
inefficiency of harvester-only rights in the simple case examined in this paper, it is unlikely that 
such a simple prescription will allow expression of other use and nonuse values. 
4. Conclusions 
In commercial fisheries, ownership by capture rules lead harvesters to dissipate net 
revenues and encourages uneconomic and biologically unsustainable harvest levels. In sport 
fisheries, the lack of effective limits on the number of sport fishers and magnitude of sportfishing 
catches has led to substantial reductions in the commercial T ACs and may have reduced overall 
net benefits to society. Although theoretically possible, the knowledge and control needed to 
maximize overall net benefit through political-regulatory management regimes is overwhelming 
and such systems have consistently failed to sustain overall net economic benefits or the resource 
base on which they depend. When political muscle is the basis for allocating T AC among 
commercial, sport, and other users, the resultant allocations cannot be expected to maximize 
overall net economic benefits. The appeal of rights-based management systems lies in their 
potential to channel rational self-interest in a way that coincidentally maximizes overall net 
benefit. Because they exploit an alignment of individually rational actions and socially optimal 
outcomes, rights-based management is potentially self-regulating. If rights can be defined in a 
way that is meaningful across use and nonuse values and to the extent that all use and nonuse 
values can be fully captured, self-interest and transferability will encourage the movement of use 
rights to the use/nonuse that generates the greatest marginal net benefit, ensuring the 
maximization of overall net benefits. 
With the apparent advantages of rights-based management systems, it seems reasonable 
to wonder why IFQs, Co-Ops, and TURFs have not been warmly embraced and uniformly 
adopted. The answer is that the creation and enforcement of rights is not costless and that the 
rights systems that have been proposed often exclude interested parties for owning rights, are not 
structured in a way that is capable of reflecting post-harvest surplus, angler surplus, or other use 
and non-use values, and do not eliminate the opportunity to freeride on the benefits (costs) of 
individual stewardship. Because it can be costly to change the legal and social institutions that 
have been developed to support current fishery management systems and because it can be costly 
to monitor and enforce quota shares or spatial use rights, especially when there are numerous 
rights-holders, rights-based management systems will be less prevalent than might otherwise be 
anticipated (Anderson and Hill 1975; Dennen 1976). 
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I The type of sport fishery that will be modeled is one in which anglers hire the services of a vessel and vessel 
operator for a single trip (8-hour) with a single target species. The vessel operator provides all of the required fishing 
gear, selects the fishing location, provides recommendations with respect to angling technique, and provides 
ancillary services related to landing and processing of catch. Providers of these types of sport fishing services are 
variously described as "charter-" or "head-boat" operators, or sportfishing "guides." 
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4 The legal defInition of property rights in the United States and many other nations is based on Roman civil law. 
Under Roman law, certain waters, the lands beneath those waters, and the living resources within those waters were 
considered to be common property outside private ownership but subject to acquisition through capture. Because the 
public 's usufruct was established in law, the State was considered to have a trusteeship responsibility for common 
property resources. Common law in the various US states is a derivative of Roman common law and has been 
interpreted to recognize a similar set of rights and responsibilities with respect to common property resources. This 
body of common law has come to be referred to as the Public Trust Doctrine. In Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois , 
146 U.S. (1892), a landmark application of the Public Trust Doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court found that: 
"The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable 
waters and the soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties than it 
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace. " 
Because public trust resources are held on behalf of the citizens, the State may be precluded from transferring 
comprehensive ownership rights to individuals. In general, conveyance of public trust resources to private 
ownership is a usufruct that does not terminate the State 's right to capital or right to manage the resource. 
Consequently, when a right to harvest fishery resources is conveyed to individuals, the State continues to have 
responsibility for safeguarding the sustainability of those resources. The Endangered Species Act (ESA), the FCMA, 
and international treaties reinforce the stewardship responsibilities implicit in the Public Trust Doctrine. McCay 
(1998) provides an extensive discussion of the application of the Public Trust Doctrine to US fisheries. Macinko 
(1993) examines the relationship between the Public Trust Doctrine and IFQs. Although the legality of privatizing 
charter-based recreational fIshing has not yet been established, there may be precedence in the regulation and 
licensing of guided hunting opportunities. 
Another option that could be useful in some sport fIsheries would be to adopt an annual lottery based allocation 
such as that used for many big-game hunting opportunities. Because every applicant has an equal probability of 
receiving a permit and because the number of permits is set to avoid overexploitation of the stock, a lottery would be 
unlikely to conflict with interpretations of the Public Trust doctrine. If lottery winners are permitted to auction their 
permits, individuals who place the greatest value in sportfIshing for a particular species at a specific location will be 
able to obtain permits. Equity concerns are at least partially satisfIed by the fact that every applicant has an equal 
opportunity of being drawn and that permit sales are voluntary. 
5 IFQs are being considered for use in other US commercial fisheries where there is also a substantial sport fIshery, 
e.g., Gulf of Mexico red snapper. Although the State managed lake trout and yellow perch resources in Wisconsin's 
portions of Lake Superior and Green Bay in Lake Michigan are subject to high levels of sportfIshing and include 
IFQ-based commercial fisheries (Muse and Schelle, 1989), the commercial sector is very small and may not provide 
a good example of the interaction that can be expected between an IFQ-based commercial fIshery and a competing 
sport fishery. 
6 Bycatches are the incidental catches of halibut in non-target fIsheries that arise from the imperfect selectivity of the 
harvest technology. In order to preclude surreptitious targeting, all bycatches of halibut must be discarded unless 
taken with hook and line gear by individuals with permits to retain halibut. The sablefIsh fIshery is an IFQ-based 
hook and line fIshery. Many fIshers hold IFQ for both species and can consequently retain bycatches up to the limit 
of their quota share. 
7 It is important to acknowledge that while this result is probably reasonable at high levels of biomass, the data 
available for estimating angler surplus did not allow for estimation of the relationship between average trip costs and 
halibut abundance. Because it is likely that the cost of catching a halibut increase as population size declines, 
marginal angler surplus is probably overstated at low abundance levels. 
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ABSTRACT 
Arguments in favor of adopting rights-based management strategies have been 
developed primarily in the context of commercial fisheries and have focused on 
increasing the profitability of catcher vessel operations and reducing the incentive to 
deplete fish stocks. Relatively little attention has been given to the effects that alternative 
management regimes could have on the profitability of processing and support service 
businesses, consumer surplus, or to the interface between commercial fishing, sport 
fishing, and other use and nonuse demands for fishery resources. Although there is often 
congruence among users with respect to stock management and rule enforcement 
objectives, other objectives are mutually incompatible. This paper begins with a simple 
conceptual analysis of the effects of alternative regimes for management of a charter-
based recreational fishery on the magnitude of net benefits in the sport fishery and in an 
associated commercial fishery. A theoretical framework for identifying the optimal 
commercial-sport allocation and the optimal sustainable yield is developed in the 
subsequent section. The final section reports the results of an empirically based 
comparative static simulation of commercial and charter-based sport fishing for halibut 
off Alaska. 
